We're being watched.
That's because there are over 300 automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras in the Twin Cities metro area. Most of these are made by a company called Flock Safety, and every time a car passes one, it logs the license plate, location, and other identifying features of the car, like color or scratches and dents, and puts the information into a database searchable by law enforcement.
With a network of cameras taking these photos all around us, this data can have the same effect as a police officer putting a tracker on your car. And police departments aren't the only entities able to use Flock cameras – HOAs and private businesses are getting in on the fun, too. In its announcement of the new "Business Network" in June, Flock bragged about the ability for businesses to subscribe to "Hotlists," which alert subscribers to the location of select cars that pass any Flock license plate reader, regardless of who is operating the camera.
While proponents of ALPR technology say it helps law enforcement do their jobs more efficiently, it turns out a database that tracks the location of entire communities is ripe for abuse. Officers have been documented using Flock cameras to track ex-girlfriends, conduct a nationwide search for a Texas woman who got an abortion, and share information with ICE.
Flock recently won a court case in Virginia stating that police officers do not need a warrant to search their database. With their network of cameras growing and showing no signs of slowing down, we talked with Alicia Granse, an attorney with ACLU Minnesota, to learn more about the current state of ALPR surveillance in the Twin Cities.
You can read the transcript of City Cast's interview with Alicia Granse below. The conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Sean McPherson: Alicia Granse, thank you so much for joining City Cast today.
Alicia Granse: Thanks Sean, for having me. It's a real pleasure.
Sean: I bet you we will talk about some things that are not a real pleasure because there's some tough things about this conversation. But I do want to foreshadow, there's a light at the end of the tunnel in my opinion because the ACLU actually has put out some good principles that I find reasonable and relatively accommodating.
And I'm looking forward to running through those a little bit later in this conversation. But first, we have to get a bird's eye view about these cameras. For folks who are all hearing about this for the very first time right now, Alicia, what should they know about these cameras and how they're being used?
Alicia: So these Flock cameras are capturing information that really isn't permitted under Minnesota state law. So Minnesota statute allows photographs of cars that capture license plate and car make and model. But what's happening with Flock cameras is that they're taking pictures of larger areas.
They're taking pictures of the whole car, maybe the area around the car, and they can really get a lot of data from those camera photos or from those stills. Flock cameras are capable of detecting race, gender, and how many people are in the car. So it's a matter of making sure that our law enforcement agencies aren't actually asking for that data or keeping that data, and ensuring that Flock itself isn't capturing or keeping the data either.
The hard part about this is Flock is a private company, and it's much easier for us as the public to get information from government agencies because we have the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act.
Private company data is a lot harder to get to. We can ask for audit trails from the government; that's something that's also required under Minnesota statute, but we just don't have the same ability to get data from Flock as we do from government agencies.
Sean: One picture of one license plate could be comparatively innocuous. It's something that's relatively visible as you're traveling around this world. But there's an idea that when there's networks of cameras that can talk to one another, those individual photos become a lot more powerful in stitching together a story of where you went on a particular day, perhaps even who you went with and what you might have been up to.
So why is the plurality of these cameras collectively taking these pictures of license plates and more details about the cars much more nefarious than just a single photo of one license plate?
Alicia: Sean, you really hit the nail on the head there. The cameras can track your location for hours, days, months. The Minnesota statute allows for data collection to be stored for up to 60 days. So presumably, a law enforcement agent could be tracking your movements for up to 60 days.
This was not possible before all of these cameras, before all of the surveillance. Usually, in order to get that level of surveillance, you would need a warrant. And you'd presumably be engaging in this surveillance for investigating serious crimes. But here, all of that data is just at the fingertips of government agencies without there needing to be a requirement that it be a serious crime.
Sean: The state patrol from Minnesota says they get rid of the data that they gather within 48 hours, which seems to be one of the only state patrols that has a policy and one of the quickest deletion rates. For you, is there any comfort in the fact that Minnesota State Patrol deletes their data after 48 hours?
Alicia: It's better than our current state law, and it's better than Flock's own policy. Is it a good policy? No. I think when you're asking what a good policy would do, we should think about "What is law enforcement doing with this information? What do they need it for?" Essentially, what they're trying to do is determine whether a car is stolen or has some other hit like an Amber Alert or a wanted person in relation to that.
So, how long do they need data to be stored when that information can be obtained in seconds? New Hampshire has a law that restricts data retention to three minutes. So I think that's probably a good law. A best law might be 30 seconds.
General questions that I ask when law enforcement wants to use a technology is, how much does it cost in resources and to our privacy? Is it the least restrictive and most reasonable way to accomplish their goals? And I think generally speaking, Flock camera use by law enforcement isn't hitting any of those criteria in the right way. They're keeping the data for too long. They're using it for other purposes. They're sharing it with people that they shouldn't be sharing it with.
Sean: Another metric I'd highlight is how fruitful it is compared to how many times it goes unused. And we're talking about 0.005% of this data that's captured actually being useful. In the ACLU paper about this, they're talking about this huge dragnet that is not actually capturing much useful information for the pursuit.
And it used to be more expensive to capture data, but now that it's so comparatively cheap, and it can be outsourced to citizens or to people who are putting up these cameras, it's so much more plausible to live in a police state. I want to bring that up because the ACLU points out that although this might start with the idea of "let's find people whose cars got stolen," there's always a creep when you get this data.
Whatever the premise is to start using Flock's technology, it can go worse. How can it go worse, and what can be done about it when these cameras are abused?
Alicia: I'll start with your last question: how do we rein in law enforcement? How do we stop this police state from coming? I mean, one could argue we're already there.
People need to be engaged because when you're living in a democracy, you can go tell the local police department, you can go tell your city council member, you can go tell your state representative what you want. You can write an email. You can go to city council meetings because at the end of the day, we can go and make change. We can change the Minnesota statute that governs ALPRs. We can say, "Nope, you can't use those here. Those are unlawful. Just full stop." People are worried about whether this technology will be used for their neighbor, who is undocumented. Is the data going to ICE? Is the data going to a sheriff in Texas about a woman who got an abortion?
If we all know about it, we can stop it, or at least I hope so. That's what I tell myself every day when I get out of bed. We can take the power back.
Sean: Alicia, I am happy to report that I see a small light at the end of the tunnel. This comes from the ACLU's principles for this technology going forward. Could I read some of these and just get a little of your feedback as I go through them?
Alicia: That sounds great, Sean.
Sean: First one, biggest one to me. "License plate readers may be used by law enforcement agencies only. No private companies can use these license plate readers."
Aliciae: I agree. The reason we're doing that is, law enforcement is hopefully using the cameras for a legitimate purpose, right? It's not to be given to private data brokers, to private companies to be able to access that data and use it to target us for other things.
Sean: The second one, "The government must not store data about innocent people for any lengthy period." The idea there is that we don't want the state to build a dossier on us without a warrant. I'm with that, I'm moving onto the next one.
"People should be able to find out if plate data of vehicles registered to them are contained in a law enforcement agency's database." Do you have any thoughts on this one?
Alicia: I think, as a general matter, we should know what data law enforcement has about us. Are they investigating us? What are they doing with their time? So yes, a hundred percent. We should be able to use our Data Practices Act powers and request information on our license plate.
Sean: The next principle from this ACLU document: "Law enforcement agencies should not share license plate reader data with third parties that do not follow proper retention and access principles. They should also be transparent regarding with whom they share license plate reader data."
Alicia: I'd say that it's really important that police departments are following this point. For example, Wayzata is using Flock cameras, and one of the agencies that they're sharing with is the Financial Crimes Intelligence Center in Texas.
I'm not sure why the Wayzata PD is sharing license plate data with a federal intelligence center in Texas, but that's what's happening. The fact that they're sharing data is disclosed on their website, but why are they sharing data with that agency? This is one of those slippery slope moments. It's like, "I'm gonna use it for a legitimate purpose, but then I'm gonna share it with the federal government, who might share it with ICE."
Sean: The last principle from this list says, "any entity that uses license plate readers should be required to report its usage publicly on at least an annual basis."
And that is something I did see a lot of states are complying with. I'm sure not all of them are doing so eagerly, and I'm sure not all of them thoroughly, but it does seem like common sense that if you're gonna gather this data, we should be able to know how you're using it on an annual basis.
Alicia: Yeah. The government is for the people, by the people, and the government should be sharing its activities when they're accessing license plate readers. We should know when they're sharing data. And I think that it should be in a report that's easily accessible, posted online every year. It shouldn't fall on the people to have to think, "How do I request this data?" This should just be out there.
Sean: Alicia Granse, you have been very generous with your time and very honest about the troubles we're facing with Flock cameras and automated license plate readers. I appreciate you being here to talk with City Cast Twin Cities.
Alicia: It has been a real pleasure.
